The United States at War
with the Barbary States
Early
Prior to the Revolutionary War, the North American colonies were afforded the protection of the British navy in their dealings with the Barbary corsairs. At the outbreak of the revolution, this right of protection ceased. Taxation without representation, it seems, had included protection for commercial shipping.
The impact of the loss of this protection was not felt immediately. The major predator on American shipping was Great Britain, a more formidable threat than the corsairs. With the successful conclusion of the war, the new nation found itself not only without this protection but also running the risk of pursuit by the corsairs at the behest, or goading, of Great Britain in an attempt to limit commercial competition.
U.S. diplomats negotiating the new treaty of commerce and amity with France, had hoped to include provisions for protection in the Mediterranean of American commercial shipping. The best that could be negotiated was France's intercession with the Barbary States to begin discussions.
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By 1782 John Adams pursued and finalized a treaty with the
Netherlands, similar to that with France which offered to mediate in a
negotiation. Adams had hoped for, from both France and the Netherlands,
protection similar to that which the British had provided prior to the
Revolutionary War. With these agreements, began the United States' misguided
attempts at placating the Barbary States and a compromise of principles avoiding
foreign entanglements.
By 1785, the Emperor of Morocco had expressed interest in a treaty with the United States. Congress appointed a commission consisting of John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson to develop a treaty of amity and commerce with Morocco and the other Barbary States. In early reports to Congress, their request for funding limitations and discussion of specific dollar amounts with French Foreign Minister Vergennes indicated their early readiness to pay tribute. |
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| Source: National Archives |
The first authorized treaty with Morocco, at the cost of 5,000 pounds sterling, resulted in a highly praised treaty that permitted free movement for U.S. commercial vessels outside the Straits of Gibraltar and assurances of prisoner of war status for captives, rather than slavery, in the event of hostilities between the signatories. Thomas Barclay, negotiating for the commission, had hoped that this small tribute and good treaty might prove helpful in development of further treaties with the other Barbary States.18
There had been considerable support for an approach of appeasement. John Adams had felt that, economically, the cost of tribute exceeded the potential financial loss to U.S. shipping.19 What Adams failed to identify were the hidden costs, the cost of increasing demands for ransom and tribute, and the ongoing cost in loss of dignity to the flag of the new nation.
The commission's efforts at negotiations with the other Barbary States, particularly Algiers, did not go as smoothly. It was at this time that the Maria and Dauphin were captured. The negotiations now were no longer for a treaty of amity and commerce. They focused rather on the ransom of the twenty-one seaman. The negotiations, through the U.S. agent in Algiers, John Lamb, foundered on the price of each man with a wide range between what the commission could authorize and what the dey of Algiers demanded.20
Simultaneously the commission attempted to negotiate with Tripoli. The results were no more favorable, but the context of these discussion bears review, if only to show the nature of these states. In a very thorough study of the diplomatic correspondence dealing with the Barbary States relations, Ray Irwin paints a picture of the economic nature of these negotiations. In the negotiations, the Tripolitan Ambassador to London, Abdurrahman demanded a "tribute of a hundred thousand dollars a year--not less." Beyond this he demanded a commission for himself of ten percent. When Adams questioned his hostility, Abdurrahman explained that the Barbary States and Turkey were "sovereigns of the Mediterranean," and would permit no one to navigate without a treaty of peace.21
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Irwin, citing the diplomatic correspondence, at this point
indicated a rift between those who would pay tribute and those who would use
force. Adams and Lamb supported tribute considering both the financial aspects
and the limited chance of success against the Barbary States in a war.
Jefferson, Irwin writes, wished to see peace established "through the medium of war". Jefferson, who would later execute a war against the Barbary States, saw these events in their larger sphere. Jefferson saw war in these circumstances as a matter of justice and honor. He even proposed a confederacy where nations acting in concert could establish a "free and perpetual peace with the Barbary States."22 Their efforts in regard to Tripoli and Algiers ended without successful resolution. No confederation was formed to wage war and insufficient monies were obtained to release the American hostages. |
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| Source: National Archives | ||
