With the decline of Ottoman influence in the Mediterranean Sea in the later half of the nineteenth century, the superiority of the seas commanded by the European powers, and the relatively small size of the corsair fleet, it would be expected that the system of tribute and ransom that flourished could have been destroyed. Instead, it remained as an economic check on the smaller commercial states to the benefit of large states, particularly England.

England, the dominant sea power after the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, was in the best position to temper the adventures of the corsairs. In a widely noted pamphlet J. B. Holroyd, First Earl of Sheffield, debating with William Pitt the effects of American trade, maintained the Barbary corsairs value lay in keeping down the competition of the Americans. He said "the Americans cannot protect themselves from the latter [the Barbary States]..they cannot pretend to a navy."¹²

In correspondence from an English officer in a diplomatic post in Morocco in 1788, Letters from Barbary, the officer reported regarding the Moroccan fleet, that the English government should consider helping the emperor increase the size of his fleet because "he cannot hurt you much; but he may be a proper cheque on your enemies."¹³

It seems that the European powers felt that the Barbary powers served as a form of insurance against competition. Stronger nations such as England and France could pay less tribute, reinforced by strong navies, while small states such as the United States, Portugal and the Italian city-states would pay a higher price and suffer restricted commerce.

The cost of the tribute was high. It was estimated that the cost of tribute from Spain to Algiers between 1785 and 1790 was four and a half million dollars.¹⁴

Sir Godfrey Fisher claimed that one of his reasons for writing the book, Barbary Legend, was to dispel the image of "Christian powers meekly submitting to incessant insults and depredations from the pirates, or states of Barbary during a period of three centuries, until the 'conscience of Europe' was unexpectedly awoken from beyond the Atlantic."¹⁵ This myth Sir Godfrey hoped to dispel is, however, confirmed as true by the following table of payments made to the Barbary States in the years immediately preceding the U.S. War with Tripoli:¹⁶

 In 1816, after the U.S. war with the Barbary States, the British/Dutch combined fleet under Admiral Edward Pellew, Lord Exmouth attacked Algiers. The destruction of the town resulted in the release of 1,642 European slaves, surrender of $382,000 (Austrian), and the promise never to hold Christian slaves. Exmouth received awards from seven European nations. He had been prompted to action by the British public spurred by the action of the United States forces in their war in the Mediterranean.¹⁷